Bush does not want history rewriten because it was written just the way he wanted it to be when it was written that first time... before everyone else knew what the administration knew. Today's Bush speech sounded good but it did little except ask the public to ignore the issue underlying this thread and vow to stay the course.
Meanwhile, on staying the course, here's food for thought on finishing the mission. Who on CEG wants to step up and establish HE KNOWS BETTER than Pres. Reagan's Director of the NSA?
What's wrong with cutting and running?
August 03, 2005
Everything that opponents of a pullout say would happen if the U.S. left
Iraq is happening already, says retired Gen. William E. Odom, the head of
the National Security Agency during the Reagan administration. So why stay?
By Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.)
If I were a journalist, I would list all the arguments that you hear against
pulling U.S. troops out of Iraq, the horrible things that people say would
happen, and then ask: Aren't they happening already? Would a pullout really
make things worse? Maybe it would make things better.
Here are some of the arguments against pulling out:
1) We would leave behind a civil war.
2) We would lose credibility on the world stage.
3) It would embolden the insurgency and cripple the move toward democracy.
4) Iraq would become a haven for terrorists.
5) Iranian influence in Iraq would increase.
6) Unrest might spread in the region and/or draw in Iraq's neighbors.
7) [censored]-Sunni clashes would worsen.
8) We haven't fully trained the Iraqi military and police forces yet.
9) Talk of deadlines would undercut the morale of our troops.
But consider this:
1) On civil war. Iraqis are already fighting Iraqis. Insurgents have killed
far more Iraqis than Americans. That's civil war. We created the civil war
when we invaded; we can't prevent a civil war by staying.
For those who really worry about destabilizing the region, the sensible
policy is not to stay the course in Iraq. It is rapid withdrawal,
re-establishing strong relations with our allies in Europe, showing
confidence in the UN Security Council, and trying to knit together a large
coalition including the major states of Europe, Japan, South Korea, China,
and India to back a strategy for stabilizing the area from the eastern
Mediterranean to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Until the United States withdraws
from Iraq and admits its strategic error, no such coalition can be formed.
Thus those who fear leaving a mess are actually helping make things worse
while preventing a new strategic approach with some promise of success.
2) On credibility. If we were Russia or some other insecure nation, we might
have to worry about credibility. A hyperpower need not worry about
credibility. That's one of the great advantages of being a hyperpower: When
we have made a big strategic mistake, we can reverse it. And it may even
enhance our credibility. Staying there damages our credibility more than
leaving.
Ask the president if he really worries about US credibility. Or, what will
happen to our credibility if the course he is pursuing proves to be a major
strategic disaster? Would it not be better for our long-term credibility to
withdraw earlier than later in this event?
3) On the insurgency and democracy. There is no question the insurgents and
other anti-American parties will take over the government once we leave. But
that will happen no matter how long we stay. Any government capable of
holding power in Iraq will be anti-American, because the Iraqi people are
increasingly becoming anti-American.
Also, the U.S. will not leave behind a liberal, constitutional democracy in
Iraq no matter how long it stays. Holding elections is easy. It is
impossible to make it a constitutional democracy in a hurry.
President Bush's statements about progress in Iraq are increasingly
resembling LBJ's statements during the Vietnam War. For instance, Johnson's
comments about the 1968 election are very similar to what Bush said in
February 2005 after the election of a provisional parliament.
Ask the president: Why should we expect a different outcome in Iraq than in
Vietnam?
Ask the president if he intends to leave a pro-American liberal regime in
place. Because that's just impossible. Postwar Germany and Japan are not
models for Iraq. Each had mature (at least a full generation old)
constitutional orders by the end of the 19th century. They both endured as
constitutional orders until the 1930s. Thus General Clay and General
MacArthur were merely reversing a decade and a half totalitarianism --
returning to nearly a century of liberal political change in Japan and a
much longer period in Germany.
Imposing a liberal constitutional order in Iraq would be to accomplish
something that has never been done before. Of all the world's political
cultures, an Arab-Muslim one may be the most resistant to such a change of
any in the world. Even the Muslim society in Turkey (an anti-Arab society)
stands out for being the only example of a constitutional order in an
Islamic society, and even it backslides occasionally.
4) On terrorists. Iraq is already a training ground for terrorists. In fact,
the CIA has pointed out to the administration and congress that Iraq is
spawning so many terrorists that they are returning home to many other
countries to further practice their skills there. The quicker a new dictator
wins the political power in Iraq and imposes order, the sooner the country
will stop producing well-experienced terrorists.
Why not ask: "Mr. President, since you and the vice president insisted that
Saddam's Iraq supported al Qaeda -- which we now know it did not -- isn't
your policy in Iraq today strengthening al Qaeda's position in that
country?"
5) On Iranian influence. Iranian leaders see US policy in Iraq as being so
much in Teheran's interests that they have been advising Iraqi [censored]
leaders to do exactly what the Americans ask them to do. Elections will
allow the [censored] to take power legally. Once in charge, they can settle
scores with the Baathists and Sunnis. If US policy in Iraq begins to
undercut Iran's interests, then Teheran can use its growing influence among
Iraqi [censored] to stir up trouble, possibly committing [censored] militias to an
insurgency against US forces there. The US invasion has vastly increased
Iran's influence in Iraq, not sealed it out.
Questions for the administration: "Why do the Iranians support our presence
in Iraq today? Why do they tell the [censored] leaders to avoid a sectarian
clash between Sunnis and [censored]? Given all the money and weapons they
provide [censored] groups, why are they not stirring up more trouble for the US?
Will Iranian policy change once a [censored] majority has the reins of
government? Would it not be better to pull out now rather than to continue
our present course of weakening the Sunnis and Baathists, opening the way
for a [censored] dictatorship?"
6) On Iraq's neighbors. The civil war we leave behind may well draw in
Syria, Turkey and Iran. But already today each of those states is deeply
involved in support for or opposition to factions in the ongoing Iraqi civil
war. The very act of invading Iraq almost insured that violence would
involve the larger region. And so it has and will continue, with, or
without, US forces in Iraq.
7) On [censored]-Sunni conflict. The US presence is not preventing [censored]-Sunni
conflict; it merely delays it. Iran is preventing it today, and it will
probably encourage it once the [censored] dominate the new government, an
outcome US policy virtually ensures.
8) On training the Iraq military and police. The insurgents are fighting
very effectively without US or European military advisors to train them. Why
don't the soldiers and police in the present Iraqi regime's service do their
duty as well? Because they are uncertain about committing their lives to
this regime. They are being asked to take a political stand, just as the
insurgents are. Political consolidation, not military-technical
consolidation, is the issue.
The issue is not military training; it is institutional loyalty. We trained
the Vietnamese military effectively. Its generals took power and proved to
be lousy politicians and poor fighters in the final showdown. In many
battles over a decade or more, South Vietnamese military units fought very
well, defeating VC and NVA units. But South Vietnam's political leaders lost
the war.
Even if we were able to successfully train an Iraqi military and police
force, the likely result, after all that, would be another military
dictatorship. Experience around the world teaches us that military
dictatorships arise when the military's institutional modernization gets
ahead of political consolidation.
9) On not supporting our troops by debating an early pullout. Many US
officers in Iraq, especially at company and field grade levels, know that
while they are winning every tactical battle, they are losing strategically.
And according to the New York Times last week, they are beginning to voice
complaints about Americans at home bearing none of the pains of the war. One
can only guess about the enlisted ranks, but those on a second tour -
probably the majority today - are probably anxious for an early pullout. It
is also noteworthy that US generals in Iraq are not bubbling over with
optimistic reports they way they were during the first few years of the war
in Vietnam. Their careful statements and caution probably reflect serious
doubts that they do not, and should not, express publicly. The more
important question is whether or not the repressive and vindictive behavior
by the secretary of defense and his deputy against the senior military --
especially the Army leadership, which is the critical component in the
war -- has made it impossible for field commanders to make the political
leaders see the facts.
Most surprising to me is that no American political leader today has tried
to unmask the absurdity of the administration's case that to question the
strategic wisdom of the war is unpatriotic and a failure to support our
troops. Most officers and probably most troops don't see it that way. They
are angry at the deficiencies in materiel support they get from the
Department of Defense, and especially about the irresponsibly long
deployments they must now endure because Mr. Rumsfeld and his staff have
refused to enlarge the ground forces to provide shorter tours. In the
meantime, they know that the defense budget shovels money out the door to
maritime forces, SDI, etc., while refusing to increase dramatically the size
of the Army.
As I wrote several years ago, "the Pentagon's post-Cold War force structure
is so maritime heavy and land force weak that it is firmly in charge of the
porpoises and whales while leaving the land to tyrants." The Army, some of
the Air Force, the National Guard, and the reserves are now the victims of
this gross mismatch between military missions and force structure. Neither
the Bush nor the Clinton administration has properly "supported the troops."
The media could ask the president why he fails to support our troops by not
firing his secretary of defense.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
So why is almost nobody advocating a pullout? I can only speculate. We face
a strange situation today where few if any voices among Democrats in
Congress will mention early withdrawal from Iraq, and even the one or two
who do will not make a comprehensive case for withdrawal now. Why are the
Democrats failing the public on this issue today? The biggest reason is
because they weren't willing to raise that issue during the campaign. Howard
Dean alone took a clear and consistent stand on Iraq, and the rest of the
Democratic party trashed him for it. Most of those in Congress voted for the
war and let that vote shackle them later on. Now they are scared to death
that the White House will smear them with lack of patriotism if they suggest
pulling out.
Journalists can ask all the questions they like but none will prompt a more
serious debate as long as no political leaders create the context and force
the issues into the open.
I don't believe anyone will be able to sustain a strong case in the short
run without going back to the fundamental misjudgment of invading Iraq in
the first place. Once the enormity of that error is grasped, the case for
pulling out becomes easy to see.
Look at John Kerry's utterly absurd position during the presidential
campaign. He said "It's the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong
time," but then went on to explain how he expected to win it anyway. Even
the voter with no interest in foreign affairs was able to recognize it as an
absurdity. If it was the wrong war at the wrong place and time, then it was
never in our interest to fight. If that is true, what has changed to make
it in our interest? Nothing, absolutely nothing.
The US invasion of Iraq only serves the interest of:
1) Osama bin Laden (it made Iraq safe for al Qaeda, positioned US military
personnel in places where al Qaeda operatives can kill them occasionally,
helps radicalize youth throughout the Arab and Muslim world, alienates
America's most important and strongest allies - the Europeans - and
squanders US military resources that otherwise might be finishing off al
Qaeda in Pakistan.);
2) The Iranians (who were invaded by Saddam and who suffered massive
casualties in an eight year war with Iraq.);
3) And the extremists in both Palestinian and Israeli political circles
(who don't really want a peace settlement without the utter destruction of
the other side, and probably believe that bogging the United States down in
a war in Iraq that will surely become a war between the United States and
most of the rest of Arab world gives them the time and cover to wipe out the
other side.)
The wisest course for journalists might be to begin sustained investigations
of why leading Democrats have failed so miserably to challenge the US
occupation of Iraq. The first step, of course, is to establish as
conventional wisdom the fact that the war was never in the US interest and
has not become so. It is such an obvious case to make that I find it
difficult to believe many pundits and political leaders have not already
made it repeatedly.
---------------------------------------------------------------
Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.), is a
Senior Fellow with Hudson Institute and a professor at Yale
University. He was Director of the National Security Agency
from 1985 to 1988. From 1981 to 1985, he served as
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Army's senior
intelligence officer. From 1977 to 1981, he was Military
Assistant to the President's Assistant for National
Security Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski.
---------------------------------------------------------------
�© 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Anyway, I feel secure that someone here will want to flame Gen. Odom as a puppet of the far left. Should I start a stopwatch?
