Originally posted by Dan Nixon:Good outline of premise...flawed analysis
The documented inability over many years of weapons inspectors to find anything that was not in an above ground bunker (possibly aided by the suggestions we had that France and perhaps Russian officials were "tipping off" the Iraqis as to inspector destinations), coupled with the vast size of Iraq suggests that knowing the location suggests that it is unlikely we would know all or even most of the locations of presumed WMD.
The introduction of references to France and Russia is a red herring; your assertion here is basically that the locations of the WMD were unknown. This in no way renders my analysis flawed â??? rather it supports an important element of my premise.
Originally posted by Dan Nixon:I think what was "patently clear to military strategists" was that we would need to do one on one interrogations with captured Iraqi's and those who stepped foreward after the threat of Saddam has been removed.
This would appear to be one way to describe what actually happened â?¦ and so by definition of the actual outcome (ie: no WMD found, no verification of their existence) versus the agreed upon objective, you are basically saying that so far the action in Iraq has been a military failure.
Originally posted by Dan Nixon:That threat, BTW is not fully removed until the new government is more firmly established...many Iraqis are waiting to see who wins before committing.
Which threat? The threat of WMD are fully removed when the weapons themselves are firmly in the possession of the U.S. Army or a friendly 3-rd party, or are proven to never have existed. That none of these conditions is yet met, and that the weapons, if they exist, are no longer in the control of Saddam, is an exacerbation of the condition.
The rest of the world had some ability to put pressure on Saddam and had some degree of ability to limit any use of WMD he might consider. As a direct result of the military action we no longer have even that. Analysis intact, IMO.
Quote: I would argue we did largely prove a lack of ongoing WMD production and we defined the dual use capacity much more accurately and completely than inspectors would have in this timeframe. Prexisting pre 1991 WMD while still unaccounted for are probably degraded to a substantial degree. These would be the LEAST likely WMD that inspectors would have found as they are more likely to be burried.
To be honest, Iâ??m not sure I understand these references here â?¦ but what I think you mean is that there is some proof now that there are no new WMD and that although we havenâ??t found them yet, the old WMD probably do exist and are probably buried and therefore not a threat.
Although I believe this to be irrelevant to my analysis, it is an interesting wrinkle. Assuming this is true (please provide your sources) then one must consider whether or not this information was part of the intelligence used to make the decision for military action. It doesnâ??t seem likely as this would seem to negate the immediate nature of any threat associated with Iraqi WMD. If it was true, then that would suggest that the administration did seriously mislead everyone about the nature of the threat.
In any event, this in no way refutes my assertion that a properly planned and prosecuted military action intended to remove the threat of WMD should have most certainly included proper intelligence as to their location before being initiated.
Originally posted by Dan Nixon:As I said above, any chance of finding these rests with Iraqi informant sources, which we will have better access to with Saddam and his government eliminated.
Even though I believe this assertion to be highly doubtful (any chance of discovery rests with informants) even if it is true, does it seem logical in the context of military planning that gaining access to these informants should include the invasion of a country thought to have WMD?
Quote: I think your expectations are unrealistic, not accounting for variables (ie UN corruption) and use an overly compressed time frame.
The introduction of a reference to alleged U.N. corruption is a red herring and irrelevant to my analysis. In terms of the timeframe I will agree that there is still some possibility that WMD will be found, or their new owners identified or their non-existence proven, however, the administration doesnâ??t seem to be making this suggestion anymore. That in no way however, refutes my assertions regarding the decision to invade without knowing where the WMD were.
Originally posted by Dan Nixon:How well even basic strategies worked & objectives of wars are reached is simply not possible for many years, often the war being concluded for years.
I suggest you are confusing objectives. In the context of the agreed on objective re WMD, I disagree with your assertion.
Everything I've read about military strategy suggests that planning for specific military actions leaves virtually nothing to chance, nothing unaccounted for including clearly defined objective(s), contingencies for all possible complications; everything from â??getting inâ? to â??getting outâ? including time frame, resources required and a clear set of success metrics to know when the job was done.
Your description is more appropriate to a very large military action with a socio-political objective such as liberating a country, where a political objective might be met despite the failure of any number of military objectives. IE; Even though it was not the basis for invasion, the liberation of Iraq will likely be successful eventually, regardless of whether WMD are found or not.
Quote: War is always fluid, mistakes alwys made on both sides, intelligence is alwys wrong in every war ever fought.
Agreed â??? all the more reason to make sure the military plans leave little to no opportunity for a vastly superior force to fail, and that it remains the last resort.
Sorry - but no where near convinced my analysis is flawed.
