Originally posted by JaTo:
Originally posted by Rex Barnes:

Bush knew the CIA evidence was sketchy.


Now, yes. Back then, no.


Wrong. You can analyze a piece of evidence at any time and ascertain whether or not it can be relied upon at that time to prove a particular fact. For example, in a fraud case, I may have some evidence of intent to deceive (such as a witness' testimony that he heard the defendant admit intention to deceive the plaintiff). I can ascertain the value (or "probative weight") of that evidence by looking at the credibility of the witness (criminal record, occupation, motivation to tell the truth, etc.) and at corroborating testimony from other witnesses, and at contradictory evidence (i.e. a document proving that the witness was on a business trip on the day he claimed to have heard the defendant's admission). I look at the facts and circumstances and determine whether a reasonable jury would believe the evidence is true. It's called weighing the evidence. It's simple. People do this all day long, in all walks of life. You do it when you decide whether to take a job offer, whether to buy a particular car, or whether your spouse is cheating on you.

Bush could have done the same thing. All he needed to do was weigh the evidence. For example, take the evidence that Saddam was trying to buy uranium in Africa. If the only source for that "evidence" is that somebody said something to somebody else, and there is no corroboration, then the only intelligent thing to do is to discount that evidence. Bush should have pushed it aside as too unreliable to support a rational decision.

So you're wrong, JaTo. The CIA (and Bush) DID KNOW "back then" that the WMD evidence was weak. They had full access to all the supporting background info on all the evidence, and they knew it was too thin. They were just so determined to carry out the hit on Saddam that they didn't care.

Originally posted by JaTo:
1) Iraq didn't account for TONS of missing VX and other biotoxins. They still remain unaccounted for TODAY.


I thought you agreed that the absence of evidence does not support a decision to go to war. Only the PRESENCE of SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE supports a decision to go to war. Saddam's failure to account for the VX proves only that he failed to account for it. It doesn't prove that he still had it, or that he was going to somehow use it against America.

Originally posted by JaTo:
UN 1441 stated in NO uncertain terms that he was supposed to account for ALL previously known amounts and quantities of WMD.


A UN resolution is a paper with words on it. It may state reasons for going to war, and it may even authorize the UN to go to war, but it is NEVER sufficient to support a US decision to go to war without the UN's approval.

Look at your blatant contradiction: one the one hand, you (and Bush) say the UN resolution was a sufficient basis for the US invasion, even though the UN flat-out refused to authorize the US to invade. You can't cloak yourself in the UN resolution to justify Bush's war (a tacit acknowledgment of the UN's authority in the matter) without admitting that the very same UN refused to support the US invasion. You can't use the UN resolutions you like and disregard the ones you don't, if you are trying to use UN resolutions as a justification for Bush's war.

Originally posted by JaTo:
Failure on Hussein's part to address this meant we invaded; with ot without the UN due to the security concerns that the bulk of the American population as well the bulk of the Senate agreed was legitimate.


Everyone agrees there were legitimate security concerns. But you seem to be mischaracterizing the UN resolution 1441 as some kind of blanket authorization to the US military, which the UN has explicitly said it was not. And you seem to be characterizing the UN resolution as some like of light switch, which once flipped, required a war to follow. I think you are confusing the UN's legislative act (authorization of use of force) with the very separate executive act (UN deciding to actually go to war). The UN collectively decided that the threat was not imminent enough to justify war yet. The UN was right, wasn't it?

Originally posted by JaTo:
The Senate intelligence committies were presented with the same material the President was; Congress received a review on this material. BY THEMSELVES and without COERCION, they voted to invade.


No, they did not see the same material. Only a few Senators see everything the president sees. The rest see edited portfolios. They all know this, and they therefore traditionally defer to the president whenever there is any room for doing so.

No, the Senate did not "vote to invade." They voted to condone the use of force, in the event the Bush chose to make the executive decision to go to war. They voted not to tie the president's hands. They voted to apply more leverage on Saddam. They voted to keep all options open, including the military option.

You seem to be equating the Senate resolution with a congressional declaration of war, but they are VERY different. A declaration of war has the affirmative effect of law, and commands a number of goernmental acts.

Originally posted by JaTo:
At the time, it was considered solid.


I notice you used the passive voice here, which makes your meaning unclear. Exactly who genuinely thought that the evidence for WMDs was solid? Even the CIA admitted internally that it was not.

Originally posted by JaTo:
ties to Al-Qaeda even though Hussein has been PROVEN to have had associations and ties to terrorism; just not Al-Qaeda)


Oh, God. Didn't the Senate committee report dispense with this well enough for you? You are the last person on Earth still clinging to the "Iraq had ties to Al-Quaeda" nonsense.


Originally posted by JaTo:
Originally posted by Rex Barnes:
If you want to maintain that he was allowed to skip straight to the assessment's conclusion and adopt it as his own, then you scare the hell out of me. I'll never understand how you can hold the chief executive to such a low standard of performance.


If the assessment approximated what this administration feared and were most concerned over (and for all intents and purposes, it DID), then PLEASE inform me of a valid reason NOT to attack, given the intel we had on-hand then?


How about: 1) the evidence for WMDs was paper-thin, and 2) we could have shared the cost and risk of the mission (if it ever became necessary) by waiting and cooperating with the UN.



2000 Contour LX